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Consider an atomistic developer who decides when and at what density to develop his land, under
a property tax system characterized by three time-invariant tax rates: the tax rate on pre-development land
value, the tax rate on post-development residual site value, and the tax rate on structure.  Arnott (2002)
identified the subset of property value tax systems which are neutral.  This paper investigates the relative
efficiency of four idealized, non-neutral property value tax systems (Canadian property tax system, simple
property tax system, residual site value tax system, and differentiated property tax system) under the
assumption of a constant rental growth rate.
Richard Arnott Petia Petrova
Department of Economics Boston College
Boston College









The authors would like to thank Will Strange for proposing the topic of the paper, seminar participants
at the University of California, Berkeley, the European University Institute, GREQAM, Queen s University
and Syracuse University for helpful comments; Almos Tassonyi of the Department of Finance, Government
of Ontario, Canada for calculating Toronto s eﬀective property tax rates for 1985; Ian Mead for bringing
data on eﬀective property tax rates in the U.S. to our attention; Mark Liu for preparation of Figures 5 and
7; and Shihe Fu for research assistance. The  rst draft of the paper was written while Arnott was visiting
the Fisher Center at the University of California, Berkeley, the second while he was visiting GREQAM. He
would like to thank both for their hospitality. We would like to dedicate the paper in memory of Louis-André
Gérard-Varet for his tireless eﬀorts in encouraging the application of public economic theory to policy issues
in French local public  nance.
This paper follows the literature in using  property taxation  in two senses: as a generic term for
the wide variety of systems of taxing land and buildings, and for the speci c form of taxation in which a
developed property is taxed on the basis of its market value. Hopefully, the usage will be apparent from
the context.
1
Through the centuries land and real property taxation have taken many forms. Land has
been taxed on the basis of area, foot frontage, and agricultural rent generated. And real
property has been taxed on the basis of the number of windows, chimneys, or balconies,
property rents, and estimated property values, among other things. A central tradeoﬀ
in the choice of how to tax land and structures is between eﬃciency and ease of tax
collection. Foot frontage is easy to measure but taxing foot frontage gives rise to long,
narrow lots; taxing the number of windows is simple but leads to windows being bricked
up in structures built before the tax was imposed, and to structures built subsequently
having a small number of large windows; and so on.
In the Anglo-Saxon countries at least, the dominant debate today vis-à-vis land and
real property taxation concerns the choice between land/site value taxation, property
value taxation, or some hybrid. The de ning diﬀerence between these taxes concerns
the tax base of properties: under property taxation, the assessed market value
of the developed property is taxed; under site value taxation, the tax base subsequent
to development is the imputed value of the land; under diﬀerentiated property taxation,
the imputed values of land and structure are both taxed but at diﬀerent rates. The
same tradeoﬀ occurs. Site value taxation in its purest form is non-distortionary, but
subsequent to development measuring such site value is fraught with diﬃculty. At the
other extreme, property taxation is relatively easy to apply since property values can be
estimated quite accurately from market transactions, but is distortionary   encouraging
ineﬃciently low capital intensity in construction. Confronted with this tradeoﬀ diﬀerent
jurisdictions have made diﬀerent choices. Property taxation is the norm in North America;
in mainland China, site value taxation is employed; while Australia and New Zealand (and
Pittsburgh) have chosen diﬀerentiated property taxation.
An essential element of the debate entails quantifying the deadweight loss associated
with the various forms of property taxation. The traditional analysis due to Cannan
(1899, reprinted 1959) and Marshall (1961) has two distinctive features. First, it is partial
equilibrium, analyzing the eﬀects of taxing a single property in isolation. Land is treated








Hamilton (1975) introduces zoning into this model, and lays out a set of conditions under which the
property tax becomes a non-distortionary bene ts tax.
is treated as perfectly-elastically-supplied, so its taxation is distortionary. The second
distinctive feature of the Marshallian analysis is that it treats the taxes as falling on rents
rather than   as is actually the case   on values. The deadweight loss generated by
the structure component of the property tax can then be portrayed diagrammatically as
a conventional deadweight loss triangle.
One line of subsequent work (most notably, Mieszkowski (1972)) has analyzed property
taxation from the perspective of static, general equilibrium theory à la Harberger. In the
basic variant of the model, the structure component of the property tax is viewed as a tax
on capital in the building sector. A more sophisticated variant recognizes that diﬀerent
jurisdictions tax property at diﬀerent rates. The rate of the structure component
of the property tax is viewed as a tax on capital in the building sector, and jurisdiction-
speci c deviations in the tax rate from the average rate as generating excise tax eﬀects.
This branch of the literature continues in the Marshallian tradition by treating the taxes
as falling on rents rather than on values.
Another line of subsequent work retains Marshall s partial equilibrium perspective but
employs a dynamic analysis   speci cally capital asset pricing theory   and treats the
taxes as falling on values rather than rents. Shoup (1970) investigated the eﬀect of prop-
erty taxation on a developer s choice of to construct a  xed project on a vacant lot,
taking the time path of rents as given. Arnott and Lewis (1979) extended Shoup s analysis
to allow for variable building density. Capozza and Li (1994) subsequently investigated
how these results are modi ed by uncertainty, with rents being generated by an exoge-
nous stochastic process. A closely related group of papers has focused on the neutrality of
site value taxation. A neutral tax does not alter the developer s choice of timing or den-
sity, and therefore generates no deadweight loss. The  rst three papers (Skouras (1978),
Bentick (1979), and Mills (1981)) came to the unorthodox conclusion that site value
taxation is distortionary. It was subsequently shown that this result hinges on how post-
development site value is de ned. Once an immobile and durable building is constructed
on a site, the market provides a valuation for the property (site and building together)
but not separate valuations for the site and the building. Thus, post-development site
value must be . Skouras, Bentick, and Mills all de ned post-development site
value as property value minus structure value, which is now termed site value,
and hence showed that residual site value taxation is distortionary, discouraging density.
Tideman (1982), following Vickrey (1970), demonstrated that the orthodox conclusion
that site value taxation is neutral is restored if post-development site value is instead de-
 ned as  what the market value of the land would be if there were no building on the site
(though in fact there is) ; this alternative de nition is termed site value. The policy
debate these papers spawned (e.g., Netzer (1998), Tideman (undated), and Mills (1998))
has concentrated on the practicability of employing either de nition; in particular, how
might post-development residual site value and raw site value be estimated in practice,
and how accurate would such estimates likely be? The majority view is that residual site














Source: Calculated from Ontario Ministry of Municipal Aﬀairs and Housing, Municipal Analysis and
Retrieval System (MARS) Database.
Source: CMHC Rental Market Surveys. Over the period the rental growth rates on bachelor, one-
bedroom, two-bedroom, and three-bedroom apartments were .84%, .90%, 1.00% and .93%.
Fisher and Peters (1998), Table 4.3, provides data on the lowest and highest eﬀective property tax rates
in 1992 for a sample of cities within a state, for a selection of states. Indiana s  gures are 3.72%, 4.39%;
Iowa s 4.23%, 4.68%; and Minnesota s 4.81%, 5.30%. Thus, the eﬀective property tax rate for Toronto is
by no means an outlier.
estimation would not only result in a tax system that was perceived as more capricious
and hence less fair, but would also likely lead to more corruption in assessment and more
wasteful litigation in assessment appeals. Thus, the central tradeoﬀ is between the greater
eﬃciency of the raw site value tax and the lower administrative costs (broadly speaking)
of the residual site value tax. And the magnitude of the deadweight loss associated with
residual site value taxation is an essential element of the debate.
This paper contributes to this strand of the literature by investigating the
associated with alternative property tax systems, treating the taxes as taxes on values
rather than rents and in a partial equilibrium context. More precisely, it considers the
subset of property tax systems that can be characterized by three time-invariant tax rates
  one on pre-development land value, a second on post-development structure value,
and a third on post-development residual site value. And for this subset of property tax
systems, it relates the deadweight loss from taxation applied to the single property to the
three tax rates, as well as to the time path of rents, the form of the structure production
function, and the interest rate. Particularly neat results are obtained for the  Canadian 
property tax system, which exempts land prior to development from taxation and then
taxes value subsequent to development (hence taxing post-development residual
site value and structure value at the same rate, ). Under the simplifying assumptions
that agricultural rent is zero and that  oor rent grows at a constant rate , it is shown that
the present value of property tax revenues is maximized by setting the post-development
property tax rate equal to the growth rate of  oor rent; a higher property tax rate puts
taxation on  the wrong side of the Laﬀer curve . The marginal deadweight loss associated
with the revenue-maximizing tax rate is, of course, in nity. At lower tax rates the marginal
deadweight loss is shown to be ; if therefore  oor rent grows at two percent, the
application of a one percent property tax (i.e., one percent of property value) generates
a 100% marginal deadweight loss   the marginal dollar of tax revenue collected has a
social cost of two dollars. In 1985, the average eﬀective property tax rate in the City
of Toronto for residential (six storeys or less) housing was 1.1% and for multi-family
residential (more than six storeys) 4.2% , while the annual growth rate in real apartment
rents in the Toronto CMA between 1979 and 1989 was less than one percent. These
observations suggest that the Toronto property tax has been highly distortionary. Similar
results are obtained for many other jurisdictions.
Such back-of-the-envelope calculations are, of course, subject to numerous quali ca-
tions, but do indicate   as its critics have argued   that some forms of property taxation
may be very ineﬃcient, and accordingly that switching to less distortionary but adminis-
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We assume throughout that exogenous variables and parameter values are such that asset values are
 nite.
Section 2.1 introduces the basic model in the absence of taxation. The rest of Section
2 introduces property taxation, and derives the general formulae for the present values
of tax revenue collected and of deadweight loss. Section 3 applies the results to four
broad classes of property tax systems, employing numerical examples. Section 4 presents
quali cations, discusses possible extensions, and concludes.
Since the theory is developed at length in a companion paper (Arnott [2002]), its presen-
tation here will be compact.
The model is essentiallythat presentedin Arnott and Lewis [1979]. An atomistic landowner
owns a unit area of undeveloped land. He must decide when to develop the land and at
what density ( oor-area ratio). Once built, the structure is immutable; no depreciation
occurs and no redevelopment is possible. He makes his decisions under perfect foresight.
To simplify even further, it is assumed that the interest rate, the price per unit of capital,
and the structure production function are invariant over time, and also that land prior to




structure production function ( )
rent per unit  oor area at time    oor or structure rent
interest rate
price per unit of structure capital
The structure production function indicates how many units of structure are produced
when units of capital are applied to the unit area of land. For concreteness, one may
think of as the number of units of rentable  oor area per unit area of land ( oor-area
ratio), or less precisely but more intuitively as the number of storeys in the building (which
assumes an exogenous coverage ratio).
The developer s problem in the absence of taxation is
(1)
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Eq.(2) states that,  xed, developmenttime should be such that the marginal bene t
from postponing construction one period (the one-period opportunity cost of construction
funds) equal the marginal cost (the rent forgone). Eq.(3) states that,  xed, capital
should be added to the land up to the point where the increase in rental revenue due to
an extra unit of capital, discounted to development time, equal the unit price of capital.
Figure 1 portrays the  rst-order conditions in T-K space. Both  rst-order conditions
are positively-sloped, and the second-order conditions for an interior maximum require
that rents be growing at development time and that the  rst-order condition for be
steeper than that for (which, with a constant rate of rental growth, is equivalent to the
requirement that the elasticity of substitution between land and capital in the production
of structure be less than one). Multiple local interior maxima are possible and might
indeed occur due to cyclical  uctuations, but to simplify the analysis we assume that
there is a unique interior maximum, which is the global maximum.
We shall have occasion to use several diﬀerent asset values. To simplify notation,
we write these values on the assumption that development takes place at the pro t-
maximizing developmenttime and density; for example, we write for post-development
instead of .
Post-development property value is
(4)
Some property tax systems (e.g., Australia, New Zealand and Pittsburgh) tax post-
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2.2 The model with taxation
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By de nition, . With smoothly growing rents, if the land remains undeveloped after the pro t
maximizing development time has passed , conditional on the land being undeveloped at time it is
pro t-maximizing to develop it right away, in which case . It is possible, however, that the housing
market is in a slump at time so that even though the pro t-maximizing development time has passed,
conditional on the land being undeveloped at time it is pro t maximizing to develop later, in which case
.
the spatial  xity of structures, land and structure value are not separately observable after
development. Thus, post-development structure and site values are values. The
literature on the neutrality of land value taxation has analyzed two diﬀerent concepts for
post-development land or site value. The  rst, , denoted by , equals
property value minus (depreciated   though here no depreciation is assumed) structure
value:
(5)
The second site value, denoted by , is what the land would be worth at time
were it vacant, even though in fact it is developed:
(6)
where is the pro t-maximizing development time conditional on the land being
undeveloped at time , and the corresponding pro t-maximizing capital-land ratio.
Since no depreciation is assumed, post-development is simply . Pre-
development is
(7)
Because development occurs at the pro t-maximizing time and density,
(8)
In what follows we ignore the taxation of raw site value since in our opinion the diﬃculty
of estimating it would render its taxation impractical. We should, however, note that
a hypothetical property tax system which taxes pre-development land value and (post-
development) raw site value at the same rate, and exempts (post-development) structure
value from taxation, is neutral   does not aﬀect the developer s choice of development
time and density, and hence entails no deadweight loss. Since the developer s tax liability
over time is independent of her choices, raw site value taxation is lump sum and so does
not aﬀect her decisions.
We restrict our analysis to the class of property tax systems characterized by three
time-invariant tax rates: the tax rate on pre-development land value, ; the tax rate on
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Under the property tax systems in most Canadian provinces, pre-development agricultural land is taxed
on the basis of what it would be worth if it were held in agricultural use forever. Under our assumption
that land prior to development generates no rent, this corresponds to a zero tax rate on pre-development
land value.
value, . We shall examine four diﬀerent types of property tax systems. Under a
property tax system, ; the tax rates on pre-development land value
and post-development residual site value and structure value are all the same. Under
a property tax system, ; property is untaxed prior to
development , while after development property value is taxed, which is equivalent to
taxing post-development residual site value and structure value at the same rate. Under
a site value tax system , with ; pre-development land
value and post-development residual site value are taxed at the same rate while post-
development structure value is exempt from taxation. Finally, a property
tax system is like the common property tax system, except that the common tax rate on
pre-development land value and post-development residual site value is higher than that
on post-development structure value: .
The rest of this section treats the general case. In the next section, we shall explore
the properties of the above four diﬀerent types of property tax systems using numerical
examples.
We  rst derive the asset valuation formulae and the corresponding  rst-order condi-
tions. Post-development residual site value is
(9a)
Diﬀerentiation with respect to yields
which has the solution
(9b)
Thus, the tax on structure value increases the cost of capital by the tax rate on structure
value, while the tax on residual site value increases the post-development discount rate
by the tax rate on residual site value. Pre-development land value equals
(9)
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Hence, the pre-development land value tax increases the pre-development discount rate
by the tax rate on pre-development land value.
The developer chooses and so as to maximize (10). The  rst-order conditions are
(11)
(12)
Eq.(11) states that optimal development time occurs when the marginal bene t from
postponing development one period equals the marginal cost. The marginal bene t equals
the savings from postponing construction cost one period, which equals construction costs
times the user cost of capital, , plus the savings in site/land value tax payments,
. The marginal cost equals the rent forgone. Eq.(12) states that capital
should be added to the site up to the point where the discounted rent attributable to the
last unit of capital equals the discounted value of the user cost, with the discount rate
equal to the interest rate plus the tax rate on post-development residual site value.
The eﬀects of each of the three tax rates on pro t-maximizing development time and
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Note:*Building earlier at higher density can be ruled out.
This intuition is correct for the special case of a constant growth rate of rents, but not generally. See
for the presence of property taxation. We assume that rents are  on average  rising over
times. Under this assumption, the geometric implications of the second-order conditions
are qualitatively the same as for Figure 1. Consider  rst . From (11),
; from (12), the assumption that rents are on average rising over
time implies that the denominator is positive. A rise in the pre-development land value
tax rate therefore causes (11) to shift up. From (12), . Thus, as intuition
suggests, a rise in the pre-development land value tax rate causes earlier development at
lower density. These and the other comparative static results with respect to and
are recorded in Table 1.
Comparative static eﬀects of tax rates on development time and density
-? * ? *
-? * ? *
Since the ineﬃciency due to a property tax derives from  how far from neutral  the
property tax system is, it is of interest to characterize neutral property tax systems. For
most of the paper, we shall focus on the special but central case where  oor rent grows at
a constant rate. For this case, Arnott (2002, Prop. 2) gives the result that: When  oor
rent grows at a constant rate , a neutral property tax system has the properties that
(13)
and provides two diﬀerent intuitive explanations. The  rst is casual, the second exact.
A residual site value tax system has no eﬀect on the development
timing condition (see (11)), but by increasing the discount rate causes the development
density condition to shift down, resulting in earlier development at lower density. Take
this as the starting point and consider how , and should be modi ed to restore
neutrality. First, capital should be subsidized to oﬀset the depressing eﬀect of residual
site value taxation on development density. But from (11), the subsidization of capital
advances development by reducing the marginal bene t from postponing development.
The development timing condition, which was undistorted with residual site value taxa-
tion, becomes distorted, leading to excessively early development. This can be corrected
by setting the pre-development land value tax rate below the post-development site value
tax rate. This intuition suggests that a neutral property tax system has and
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Appendix 2 to Arnott [2002].
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site rent tax system with a time invariant tax rate (post-development site rent is de ned
as rent net of amortized construction costs) which is neutral. Thus, how distortionary a
property tax system is depends on how far it deviates from site rent taxation at a constant
rate.
De ne to be the discounted (and brought forward) social surplus from the site,
evaluated at time . This equals the discounted social bene t from the site, which equals
the discounted revenue it generates, minus discounted construction costs. Thus,
(14)
Letting denote the pre-tax situation, the after-tax situation, and the deadweight
loss from the site evaluated at time :
(15)
The social surplus from the site accrues to landowners, in the form of land value less
brought-forwardtax payments(before development)or propertyvalue less brought-forward
construction costs less brought-forward past tax payments (after development), , and




Eq. (16c) indicates that deadweight loss may be calculated as the loss in landowner
surplus minus tax revenue.
With a tax on pre-development land value, the value of tax revenue collected depends
on when the tax was  rst imposed. Let and possibly represent this date, and
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the eﬀects of a property tax system applied to an undeveloped site from today on.
from today forward.
Let denote the value of the revenue collected after development. Then
using (9a)
using (14) and . (17b)
Also,
(17c)




In evaluating property tax systems, we assume that there is currently no prop-
erty tax system in place and a choice is to be made concerning what property tax system
to apply from today forward. This choice would be uninteresting if the site is already
developed since property taxation would then have no real eﬀects. Thus,
This
conceptual excercise has two important implications. First, if the pro t-maximizing de-
velopment time computed per (11) and (12) is positive, then the pre-development land
value tax is  rst applied today, i.e. Second, if the pro t-maximizing development
time computed per (11) and (12) is negative, then (11) is replaced by the condition that
development will occur at the most pro table time
12
Suppose , is  nite and . Then, from (17c) and (18b), and
. If, furthermore, , , and are all small, then the government expropriates the entire
surplus from the site with no distortion. The  rst result states that if the government initially imposes
the pre-development land tax in nitely far into the past at a rate such that , it expropriates
the entire surplus from the site. The second result indicates that this expropriation can be achieved with
essentially no distortion if additionally the tax rates are suﬃciently small. The practical relevance of this
neutrality result is open to question!
There is a problem with our conceptual exercise. Consider two property tax systems A and B. Choosing
between the two tax systems today, A is preferred to B. However, if the choice were to be made ten years from
now, Bmight be preferred to A. Such time inconsistency could arise if, for example, both tax systems yielded
the same pro t-maximizing development time and density, but tax system A generated more discounted
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The equations derived earlier in this subsection were general. We now particularize
them to the conceptual excercise we are performing. Let denote pro t-maximizing
development time computed per (11) and (12), and denote the pro t-maximizing
development time from today forward.














In all the examples we shall consider, when
Since by assumption no tax revenue is raised before , whether or ,
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3 Four Property Tax Systems
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pro t-maximizing structural density
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The general relationship is Also in general, so that
Thus (19) applies when which holds since no tax revenue
is collected prior to .
which states that , immediately after the imposition of any form of property taxation,
land value plus discounted tax revenue plus discounted deadweight loss equals land value
prior to taxation.
The analysis obtains the deadweight loss from applying alternative property tax sys-
tems to a particular site in isolation. Extending the analysis to determine the eﬃciency of
alternative tax systems applied to an entire jurisdiction requires a fuller model which ac-
counts for the heterogeneity of sites as well as (unless the jurisdiction is completely open)
for the endogeneity of rents. Thus, the reader should be cautious not to over-interpret
the paper s very partial equilibrium analysis.
Throughout this section we shall assume that structure rents grow at a constant rate over
time, which considerably simpli es the analysis. To simplify the algebra, we ignore the
complications which arise when ; we do, however, take account of these complications
in our numerical examples. To further simplify notation, we omit the superscript on
after-tax variables, when there is no danger of ambiguity.
With this assumption, from (10):
(20)
The corresponding  rst-order conditions are
(21)
(22)
Dividing the two  rst-order conditions yields
(23)
By the second-order conditions, the elasticity of substitution of is less than one. Since
is therefore increasing in K, (23) implies that
. Thus, we may write
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This result was  rst demonstrated in Arnott and Lewis (1979).
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If the rate of rental growth is constant and if the second-order conditions
of the developer s pro t-maximization problem are satis ed, then:i) development density
is decreasing in and independent of and ; ii) development time increases with
and and and decreases with .
which indicates that pro t-maximizing development time increases with and and
decreases with . The second-order conditions, , , and , guarantee that
there is a unique maximum, which is interior. These results are of suﬃcient importance
that we record them in:
Following the discussion of the previous section, we shall take . Then from (17c),
(14), and (20):
(25)
Finally, from (14) and (15):
(26)
We now consider four idealized property value tax systems. We start with what we
have referred to as the Canadian property tax system, since it is the neatest and easiest
to analyze.
Many Canadian provinces and some U.S. states tax agricultural land on the basis of what
it would be worth if it were held in agriculture forever (Youngman and Malme (1993)).
Since pre-development land rent in our model is zero, application of such a tax system
would result in no tax liability prior to development, which corresponds to . It
can be seen from (21) and (22) that this property tax system causes both the timing and
density  rst-order conditions to shift down, and from (23) in such a way that development
occurs at the same density as in the absence of taxation but at a later date   as displayed
in Figure 3. That density is unaﬀected by the property tax system considerably simpli es
the calculations. From (24):
(27)
From (25), the discounted revenue raised from the tax is
(28)
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From (20) and (21):
(29)




(using (27) and (29)). (31)
Then from (19):
(32)
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= 03 = 02 = 024731 = 2 2408
= 50 (0) = 1
(0) = (0) (0) = (0) (0)
01 5 0 1 0 0 0
01 1 84 7 354 530 116 1 0
02 1 104 9 192 577 230
03 1 119 3 125 563 312 3 0
= 0 (0) = (0) = 0






ln = 34 7
Under the Canadian property tax system:a) The revenue-maximizing tax
rate is . b) The marginal deadweight loss (MDWL) is .
Proof:
a) Follows directly from (30).
b) The result then follows directly from (30) and (32).
Notes: i) recall that under our assumption that no tax revenue is collected prior
to , ; ii) recall (19), that the imposition of taxation at does
not change and; iii) a marginal deadweight loss of implies
that as the tax rate is raised on the wrong side of the Laﬀer curve, a dollar reduction
in revenue is associated with an increase in deadweight loss of .
The results are so simple that there should be a simple explanation of them; so far,
however, an incisive explanation has eluded us.
Part a) of Prop. 2 is interesting since it suggests that jurisdictions in which the rental
growth rate is less than the property tax rate may be on the wrong side of the Laﬀer curve.
Part b) suggests that the Canadian property tax system can be highly distortionary at
even modest tax rates.
We now present a numerical example. We choose units so that , assume
that and , and choose and so that development in
the no-tax situation occurs at and
Numerical example with Canadian property tax
Because pro t-maximizing structural density is independent of the property tax rate,
the above results hold independent of the form of the structure production function. The
results, displayed in Table 2, indicate that the eﬀects of the Canadian property tax are
substantial. With the chosen parameters, a two-percent tax rate, for example, causes land
value to fall to only of pre-tax value, generates a deadweight loss of of pre-tax
value, and causes development of the land to be postponed 55 years!
If the tax is imposed at a location for which is lower, with the exogenous functions
and other exogenous parameters held  xed, the only change is that everything occurs
later. If, for example, , everything occurs years later (see (24)).































3.2 Simple property tax system
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It bears repeating that the above results describe the eﬀects of imposing the property
tax on a single parcel of land. The general equilibrium eﬀects, which could be examined in
a growing, fully-closed monocentric city model, would be considerably more complicated.
We now consider a simple tax system in which the tax rates applied to pre-development
land value and post-development property value are the same. This is the tax system
most Americans would identify as  the property tax .
As displayed in Figure 4, the simple property tax system causes both the timing
and density  rst-order conditions to shift to the right (see (21) and (22)) such that: i)
development density falls; and ii) development time may either be postponed or brought
forward, depending on parameter values and the form of the structure production function.
From (25) and (21):
(33)
From (20) and (21):
(34)
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(35)
Unfortunately, the results for this type of property tax system are not as neat as those
for the Canadian property tax system because the tax alters structural density, which
complicates the algebra. We can, however, obtain some analytical results for the special
case of CES production functions. We assume that
where in the elasticity of substitution between land and capital in the structure




from which it follows that development is postponed or brought forward according to
whether is greater or less than zero, or
since according to whether is greater or less than
And from (21) and (36a):
(38)
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Notes: 1. *The formulae presented in this subsection are for the case . If
according to (37), development occurs today. The calculations are modi ed
accordingly. (Eq. (21) does not apply and is set to . is then determined from
(22) alone, from which follows. is then determined from (20), from
(26), and as a residual per (19) from (25). where
and ).
2. is calculated from (17a ), and as




(0) = (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
011 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
01 794 909 57 6 177 138 632 770 052 0 39
02 693 843 65 7 039 105 721 826 135 3 41
03 630 794 73 1 009 070 709 780 212 1 22
= 25 = 1 14471
01 500 750 44 1 192 106 597 703 105 1 30
02 300 600 46 2 050 075 624 699 252 1 65
03 250 500 50 0 014 048 563 611 375 1 13
=5 0 = 1 5
01 125 422 3 56 243 009 503 512 245 4 99
02 037 281 0 101 0 463 463 436 2 07
03 016 208 0 051 0 386 386 563 1 41
= 75 = 3 375







() ( + )
() = 1 + + =
(+ )
(0) (0) (0) = (0) (0)
=2 5
= 0176 (0) = 8286; = 5 = 0140 (0) = 725; = 75 = 00850
(0) = 517
We shall now use these formulae in a numerical example. We employ the same para-
meters as in the numerical example of the previous subsection, and choose and such
that in the absence of taxation. We shall consider three values for the elas-
ticity of substitution in the structure production function: . In the absence
of taxation the site is developed at and has . The results are displayed in
Table 3.
Numerical example with simple property tax
With a low elasticity of substitution for the structure production function, the devel-
oper responds to the tax by building somewhat later at slightly lower density. Compare
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Table 2 with Table 3A. The relative eﬃciency of the Canadian tax system and the simple
tax system with can be gauged by comparing the deadweight losses for a given
amount of revenue collected, or vice versa. Recall that with a constant rate of rental
growth, the tax rates for a neutral property tax system are given in (13). It is not obvious
which of the Canadian or simple tax systems deviates more from the neutral tax system.
But for the parameter values of the numerical example, with the simple tax sys-
tem with is the more eﬃcient. For intermediate values of the elasticity of substitution,
the developer responds to the tax principally by building at moderately lower density,
and for high values by building considerably earlier at considerably lower density. The
tax system becomes more distortionary the higher the elasticity of substitution, and for
the Canadian tax system is more eﬃcient than the simple tax system. Based on
empirical studies which estimate the elasticity of substitution between land and capital
in the structure production function (reviewed in McDonald(1981)), the current wisdom
is that lies between and ; and in this range the eﬃciency of the two tax systems is
similar.
Figure 5 plots versus for the Canadian property tax system and the simple
property tax system with and . As noted above, the simple property tax
system is more eﬃcient the lower the elasticity of substitution between land and capital
in the structure production function. Furthermore, the Canadian property tax system
is less eﬃcient than the simple property tax system with and but more
eﬃcient with . Since empirical evidence suggests that lies in the range ,
for the parameters of the example at least the Canadian and simple property tax systems
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Residual site value taxation is employed in China (Wong(1999)) and in some Australian
states (Youngman and Malme (1993)). Residual site value taxation leaves unchanged the
position of the timing  rst-order condition and causes the density  rst-order condition to
shift down   as displayed in Figure 6. As a result, as the tax rate rises development
occurs earlier and at a lower density.
From (25) and (21):
(39)
From (20) and (21):
(40)
And from (29), (39), and (40):
(41)
As with the simple property tax system, we assume that the structure production
function is CES. Then from (23):





















































      
          
  
      
  

































+( ) ( + ) ( + )
(0) =



















i   
rTQK i p
 c









i  i   
V
 ip
i  i   
 c
i   
e






i   
e.
and (42a,b)










We now turn to the numerical example. The parameters are exactly the same as for
corresponding case for the simple property tax system example. The results are displayed
in Table 4.
Comparing this table with Table 3, it is evident, for the example considered at least,
that residual site value taxation is more eﬃcient than simple property taxation. The only
diﬀerence between the two tax systems is that residual site value taxation exempts struc-
tures. The supplementary taxation of structures under the simple property tax system is
so distortionary that in a number of the cases treated   those with higher rates of taxation
and higher substitution elasticities   setting the tax equal, the revenue raised from
residual site value taxation is higher than under simple property taxation. Put alterna-
tively, holding the tax rate constant, revenue would be increased by exempting structures
from taxation.
There is potentially a considerable variety of hybrid property tax systems. One is the
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Notes: *1. The formulae presented in this subsection are for the case . If
according to (43), development occurs today. The calculations are modi ed
accordingly.
2. The revenue-maximizing tax rate and maximum revenue are:
(0) = (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
0115 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
01 794 909 43 2 237 128 608 736 028 0 17
02 693 843 40 2 0833 103 744 847 070 1 13
03 630 794 38 4 0351 076 780 856 109 4 14
=2 5
01 500 750 29 7 256 089 574 663 081 0 75
02 300 600 20 6 107 054 644 698 195 3 77
03 250 500 15 3 0588 033 619 651 293 1 56
=5
01 172 492 0 320 000 512 512 168 0 42
02 132 433 0 180 000 596 596 216 1 27





= 0267 (0) = 8574; = 5 = 0167 (0) = 7035; = 75 = 0415
(0) = 619
There is a more basic logical  aw in the standard rationale for a diﬀerentiated property tax system. A
pure land value tax (tax on market land value prior to development and on raw site value after development),
set at an in nite rate, extracts a site s entire discounted surplus. No property tax system can
raise more than this amount. To do so would require a negative landowner discounted surplus, which is not
possible with anticipation. Consider the eﬀects of broadening the tax base to include structures. At low
tax rates, the addition of structures to the tax base does result in higher revenue. But above a certain tax
rate, the revenue generated from structures is more than oﬀset by the decline in revenue generated from
the land deriving from the distortion caused by the taxation of structures.
Numerical example with residual site value taxation.
property tax system, employed in Australia, New Zealand, and Pittsburgh, under which
pre-development land value and post-development residual site value are taxed at the
same positive rate, and structure value at a diﬀerent rate, where is the tax rate on
 land value . The standard rationale for this type of system goes as follows: Site value
taxation is non-distortionary but does not raise suﬃcient revenue to  nance the level of
public services demanded in a modern economy, and so is supplemented with distortionary
structure value taxation but at a lower tax rate. Since these jurisdictions measure post-
development site value as residual site value, and since residual site value taxation is
distortionary, the standard rationale is  awed. It is nonetheless of interest to enquire:




































      
          
      















It can however be shown that structure value should be taxed not subsidized   see Appendix 3.
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does this ratio depend on?
The analysis is complicated by the presence of two regimes: and The way
we shall proceed is to:  rst, examine the systems of equations that applies with
without reference to the constraint that this system of equations applies when and only
when second, examine the systems of equations that applies with (and hence
) without reference to the constraint that this system of equations applies when and
only when and  nally put the pieces together.
From (23), application of this diﬀerentiated property tax system results in construction
at lower than the eﬃcient density. And since this tax system has the simple property
tax system and residual site value tax systems as special cases, it is clear from previous
results that its application may cause development to be either postponed or brought
forward. We continue to assume that structure production exhibits constant elasticity of
substitution. Thus, from (23):
(48a,b)
And then from (21):
(49)




De ne the to be the locus of that raise a given amount of
revenue with minimum deadweight loss. Analytical characterization of the eﬃciency locus
is algebraically messy. Consequently, we examine diagrammatically the eﬃciency locus
for the three examples considered in Tables 3 and 4.
Figure 7A displays iso-revenue contours, iso-deadweight-loss contours, and the corre-
sponding eﬃciency locus for For all levels of revenue indicated, The





Figure 7A:  Efficient land/site and 
          structure value tax rates: σ =.25









Notes:  What is labelled the "efficiency locus" is in fact the locus of 
             tangency points of iso-revenue and iso-deadweight loss 
             contours.  The relevant portion of this locus runs from the 














The simple property tax system is the same as the diﬀerentiated property system with
the constraint imposed that Thus, comparison of the diﬀerentiated and simple
property tax systems indicates the gains that can be achieved by taxing post-development
residual site value and structure value at diﬀerent rates. With the corresponding simple
property tax system (from Table 3), the revenue-maximizing tax rate is and the
maximum revenue . Plotting against for the diﬀerentiated property tax
system and comparing the locus with the corresponding locus in Figure 5 for the simple
property tax system would indicate the proportional eﬃciency gain achievable at diﬀerent
revenue levels from employing diﬀerentiated rather than simple property taxation.
The residual site value tax system is the same as the diﬀerentiated property tax system,
with the constraint imposed that Thus, comparison of the diﬀerentiated and
residual site value tax systems indicates the gain that can be achieved over residual site
value taxation by taxing structure value. The maximum revenue that can be achieved
under residual site value taxation is . Thus, for this example, the extra revenue that
can be generated under the diﬀerentiated property tax system from being able to tax












Figure 7B:   Efficient land and structure 
   value  tax  rates:  σ=.5
Notes:  What is labelled the "efficiency locus" is in fact the locus of 
             tangency points of iso-revenue and iso-deadweight loss 
             contours.  The relevant portion of this locus runs from the 
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Figure 7Bis the same as Figure 7A but is for (and the corresponding parameters
from Table 3). The revenue-maximizing tax rates are and , and the
maximum revenue is . Observe that is higher at the revenue maximum with
than with For the revenue-maximizing tax rate under the simple property
tax system is and the maximum revenue is . The improvement in eﬃciency
from being able to tax post-development site value and structure value at diﬀerent rates
is small. Under the residual site value tax system, the revenue-maximizing tax rate is
and the maximum revenue is .
Figure 7C is the same as Figures 7A and 7Bbut is for The revenue-maximizing
tax rates are and and the maximum revenue is . Under the
simple property tax system, the revenue-maximizing tax rate is and the maximum
revenue is , while under the residual site value tax system the corresponding  gures
are and .
These examples illustrate that, for residual site value taxation is more eﬃcient
than simple property taxation for low levels of and less eﬃcient for higher levels, which
is explained below. In all cases, the relative eﬃciency gains achieved from employing
diﬀerentiated property taxation (with and set at optimal levels) rather than simple
or residual site value taxation appear quite modest; the robustness of the result is worth
examining. Finally, for the simple, residual, and diﬀerentiated property tax systems, the
deadweight loss due to property taxation appears to be more sensitive to the elasticity of
substitution between land and structures in the structure production function than to the
form of property taxation employed, which points to the importance of obtaining more
accurate estimates of this elasticity.












Figure 7C:   Efficient land and structure 
   value  tax  rates:  σ=.75
Notes:  What is labelled the "efficiency locus" is in fact the locus of 
             tangency points of iso-revenue and iso-deadweight loss 
             contours.  The relevant portion of this locus runs from the 
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A diﬀerentiated Canadian property tax system under which and
is possible. Indeed, the neutral property tax system identi ed in (13) is an example,
under which full surplus extraction with no deadweight loss is achievable. Recall that the
maximum revenue with an undiﬀerentiated Canadian property tax system (from Table 2,
with is . Thus, for the Canadian property tax system diﬀerentiation of the
post-development tax rates generates signi cant eﬃciency gains.
In this case, T is set to is then determined from (22) alone, from which follows.
is then determined from (20), from (26) and as a residual per (19) from
(25). Since there are now two tax rates and only the capital  rst-order condition, in
the light of the argument presented in Arnott(2002), it should not be surprising that by
setting revenue can be raised without distortion,
with the amount rising with until with full surplus extraction is achieved.
Turn to Fig. 7A, which applies to the case This case applies when are
such that in (49) is greater than or equal to zero. Since in (49) is increasing in
and decreasing in and since with is a positively-sloped
locus lying above the origin. Below the locus, the equations for apply, and above
the locus those for apply. Below the locus, the eﬃciency locus is positively-




























 ,     , T
T
 ,   T
 ,     , T .
T< T>
     K Q    K QT
. . . . . .... . .
.. . . . . . . . . .












 .  .   ,
Notes: 1. Parameter values are the same as for the corresponding case of in
Tables 3 and 4.
2. indicates the global-maximizing set of tax rates and revenue.
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the eﬃciency locus as it crosses the locus; below the locus, the eﬃciency
locus takes into account that a rise in tax revenue aﬀects two margins, timing and density,
while above the locus, the eﬃciency locus takes into account that there is only the
density margin.
Now consider determination of the revenue-maximizing tax rate. There are two local
revenue maxima. The  rst is at here, timing is distorted with
instead of , but density is eﬃcient conditional on timing. The second is the revenue-
maximizing below or on the locus. If it is on the locus, it is dominated by
since that pair of tax rates is eﬃcient conditional on If it is
below the locus, there are two local maxima which must be compared; the former entails
distortion on only the timing margin, the latter less distortion on the timing margin but
more on the density margin.
The numerical results are displayed in Table 5.
Numerical example with diﬀerentiated property value taxation.
Revenue-maximizing tax rates.
A pattern is evident. For as the elasticity of substitution increases, the max-
imum surplus extraction and at the revenue maximum fall. To understand these
results, consider  rst the extreme case of Density is unaﬀected by taxation, and
eﬃcient timing can be maintained by setting (see (49)), with full surplus ex-
traction being achieved by setting In this extreme case, therefore, residual site
value taxation is non-distortionary, while simple property taxation is distortionary. As the
elasticity of substitution increases, both timing and density, and hence deadweight loss,
become relatively more sensitive to than to (see (48), (49) and (51)) implying that
simple property taxation increases in eﬃciency relative to residual site value tax system.
For and in contrast, as the elasticity of substitution increases the maxi-
mum surplus extraction rises and the revenue-maximizing tax rates remain unchanged.
To understand the former result, consider  rst the limiting case as approaches The
timing and density  rst-order conditions then almost implying that almost the
same surplus can be achieved at and an appropriately reduced density as at the
no-tax optimum, and the appropriately reduced density is achieved with full surplus ex-
traction with and At the other extreme with construction
29inter alia
4 Concluding Comments
occurs at the same density as at the no-tax optimum but  fty years earlier, which entails
considerable distortion.
This paper examined the deadweight loss due to the property tax when the property tax
is realistically modeled as a tax on value rather than as a tax on rent. The analysis was
partial equilibrium, examining the eﬀects of the property tax when it is applied to a single,
small parcel of land, and paying no attention to the disposition of the tax revenue raised.
To keep the algebra manageable, a number of simplifying assumptions were made. Most
notably, the extreme case of in nitely durable structures was considered. The landowner
decides when to build a structure on his vacant land and at what density, and subsequently
that structure remains on the site forever with no depreciation. Thus, the deadweight loss
due to the property tax derives from its changing the timing and density of construction.
The property tax was modeled as a triple of time-invarianttax rates, the  rst applied to
pre-development land value, the second to post-development (residual) site value (de ned
as property value minus construction costs), and the third to structure value (measured
by construction costs). A number of variants of the property tax were examined: i) the
 Canadian  property tax system under which property value is taxed after development,
with pre-development land value exempt from taxation; ii) the simple property tax system
under which pre-development land value and post-development property value are taxed
at the same rate; iii) the residual site value tax system under which pre-development land
value and post-development residual site value are taxed at the same rate, with structure
value exempt; and iv) the diﬀerentiated property tax system, which is like the residual
site value tax system except that structure value is taxed but at a diﬀerent rate. The
paper focused on the special case where the rate of rental growth is constant.
All four tax systems are distortionary (Arnott (2002) derives the property tax sys-
tem that is neutral in the context of the model). The Canadian property tax system
causes later development at unchanged density; the simple and diﬀerentiated property
tax systems have an ambiguous eﬀect on development time but unambiguously discour-
age density; and the residual site value tax system results in earlier development at lower
density. For the Canadian property tax system, the revenue-maximizing tax rate equals
the growth rate of rents and the marginal deadweight loss equals the tax rate divided by
the growth rate of rents less the tax rate. The corresponding results for the other property
tax systems are not as neat, depending on the current level of rents and the
elasticity of substitution between land and capital in the structure production function.
For each of the property tax systems considered, for a set of plausible parameter values
we computed deadweight loss as a function of the tax rate. Two results were particularly
striking. First, in all the numerical examples, the revenue-maximizing tax rate was lower
than the actual eﬀective property tax rate employed in many jurisdictions, suggesting
that some jurisdictions may be  on the wrong side of the Laﬀer curve  with respect to
property taxation. Second, in all the examples except for the Canadian property tax






between land and capital in the production of structures, and the revenue-maximizing tax
rate strongly negatively related to it, which points to the importance for policy analysis
of precise estimation of this elasticity.
In the course of our analysis, we encountered a general conceptual issue of how to
compare the eﬃciency of two inter temporal tax systems. Though doing so entails time
inconsistency, we compared their eﬃciency from today forward.
In the paper, we provided a reasonably thorough analysis of the eﬃciency eﬀects
of a variety of idealized property tax systems, but in the context of a speci c, partial
equilibrium model. It remains to be seen how robust our results are. There are several
important issues for future research:
1. We modeled the property tax as applying to a single, atomistic property. How
should the model be generalized to a metropolitan area or to an entire country, and how
will this generalization aﬀect the results?
2. We assumed that structures are completely immalleable. Does introducing depre-
ciation and property rehabilitation and redevelopment signi cantly alter the results?
3. We made a number of simplifying assumptions: no technical change, a constant
31
An appealing way to address this question would be to analyze the eﬀects of alternative property
value tax systems in the context of a model of growing, monocentric city with completely durable housing
model in which developers have perfect foresight (Fujita (1976), Arnott (1980), and Wheaton (1982)). Our
analysis generalizes straightforwardly to an open city since equilibrium housing rents are then unaﬀected
by property taxation. In a closed city, however, housing rents are aﬀected by property taxation, which
considerably complicates the analysis.
In a growing monocentric city with completely durable housing diﬀerent locations have diﬀerent devel-
opment times, which complicates the comparison of property tax systems to be implemented today. For
properties that have already been developed, the (unanticipated) imposition of a property tax from today
forward entails no distortion; for properties that will be developed far oﬀ into the future, the bulk of the
present value of revenue collected from the tax will be collected prior to development. Thus, a tax system
that is relatively eﬃcient at some locations may be relatively ineﬃcient at others, and the overall eﬃciency
of a tax system entails averaging over locations.
Think of the standard partial equilibrium tax analysis. The deadweight loss for a given tax rate or a
given amount of tax revenue is higher, the larger are the demand and supply elasticities. Looking at a single
property for which rent is  xed is analagous to assuming a perfectly elastic demand curve. Thus, it is natural
to conjecture that the deadweight loss from a given property tax system, whether for a particular property
tax rate or for a given amount of tax revenue collected, is lower the less elastic is demand. Accordingly,
looking at a single property with exogenous rent tends to overstate the deadweight loss due to property
taxation.
This intuition can be formalized by considering a growing closed (exogenous population) monocentric
city in which demand is such that housing unit size is  xed the elasticity of substitution between land
and capital in the production of the  oor area is zero. At a given point in time, housing unit size, the
 oor-area ratio of housing, and population are all independent of the property tax system in place; so too
therefore is the residential area of the city and the boundary of urban development. In this special case,
therefore, all property tax systems have no eﬀect on the density and timing of development, and hence
generate no deadweight loss. If the elasticity of substitution in housing production is non-zero, however,
property taxation generates deadweight loss by inducing ineﬃcient factor proportions structural density.
This line of reasonong leads to the conjecture that the deadweight loss due to a property tax system
is higher the greater the elasticity of demand for housing and the greater is the elasticity of substitution
between capital and land in the production of housing. The diﬃculty in formalizing the conjecture is in
deciding what to hold  xed while these elasticities are being varied. 
20
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In analyzing the eﬃciency of alternative property tax systems with development controls and zoning
regulations, it is important to recognize that they are imposed to deal with perceived market failure.
interest rate, no change in construction costs, zero pre-development land rent, and a
constant growth rate of  oor rent. How does relaxing these assumptions aﬀect our results
qualitatively and quantitatively?
4. Our analysis ignored uncertainty, which is surely important in property develop-
ment. Since Capozza and Li (1994) introduced stochasticity into the Arnott-Lewis model,
one obvious approach is to extend their analysis to treat a variety of property value tax
systems.
5. We assumed that the developer has complete discretion concerning when and at
what density to build. But in practice his choice is constrained by a variety of develop-
ment controls and zoning regulations. If they are so strict that they result in the same
development time and density with and without a particular property tax system, the
property tax system is neutral.
6. In an earlier version of the paper, we contrasted our analysis of the property tax
as a tax on value with the conventional analysis which treats the property tax as a tax
on rent, especially with respect to measurement of deadweight loss. This topic merits
consideration.
7. It is shown in Arnott (2002) that a tax on  net site rent  (equal to zero prior to
development and after development) is neutral. Net site rent taxation
is presumably not employed because net site rent is unobservable or observable only
at prohibitive cost. Our analysis treated observability only implicitly. Perhaps a more
explicit treatment would be fruitful.
In the introduction, we emphasized that the choice of property tax system entails a
tradeoﬀ between conventional deadweight loss and administrative costs broadly speaking.
At one extreme is a classical land value tax system, which is non distortionary but very
costly to administer. Our paper focused on quantifying deadweight loss. As important
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Relative Eﬃciency of the Canadian and Simple Property Tax Systems
We start by recording the formulae for revenue raised from the Canadian property tax
system, and the deadweight loss:
(30)
(32)
To obtain the corresponding formulae for the simple tax system will require some
additional algebra. Rewrite (33) and (35), using (29):
(A1.1)
(A1.2)






Substituting (A1.5) into (A1.3) yields
(A1.6)
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The relative eﬃciency of the two tax systems for a given set of parameter values can
be calculated as follows. Set and from (A1.7) and (A1.8) calculate the corresponding
deadweight loss and tax revenue. From (30) calculate the which raises the same amount
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Some insights can be gained by viewing our model as a static model, with prices
and quantities in present value terms. One unit of structure constructed today generates
present discounted revenue of Interpret this as the exogenous
consumer price of structure. Accordingly, the quantity of structure produced on a unit
of area of land   in present value terms   is , and the quantity of capital
employed   in present value terms   is . De ning the developer s net
revenue or pro t function in the absence of taxation is
(A2.1)
The corresponding  rst-order conditions for pro t-maximization are
(A2.2a)
(A2.2b)
which have straightforward interpretations.
With taxation, from (20) the developer s pro t function is
(A2.3)
The isomorphisms arise when For this special case,
(A2.4)
Comparing (A2.1) and (A2.4), we obtain the following isomorphisms.
1. A property tax system with and is isomorphic to a pro t
tax at rate This is the neutral tax system identi ed in Arnott (2002).
2. A property tax system with and is isomorphic to a tax on the input
KD at rate
3. A property tax system with and   a Canadian property tax system
  is isomorphic to an tax on the output at rate The
tax drives a wedge between the producer and consumer price. Since the consumer
price is exogenous (and the demand function therefore perfectly elastic) ,
where is the producer price. From (A2.4), Combining these two
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This result allows us to provide an explanation, albeit a rather mechanical one, for
the results presented in Prop. 2. De ne Then the tax revenue from the
Canadian property tax system may be written as
using (A2.5)
where is the supply curve. Maximizing with respect to gives an expression
for the tax-revenue-maximizing producer price:
(A2.6)
All that remains is to solve the elasticity of supply:
(A2.7)
From (23) and (27):
(A2.8)
Recalling that and gives
and (A2.9)
Combining (A2.7) and (A2.9) yields
(A2.10)
from which it follows that the revenue-maximizing tax rates are
and (A2.11)
Thus, the revenue-maximizing tax rate under the Canadian property tax system equals
the growth rate of rents because:
i) the Canadian property tax system with an exogenous time path of rents is isomorphic
to an output tax in a static model with perfectly elastic demand;
ii) the revenue-maximizing tax rate for an output tax in a static model with perfectly
elastic demand equals the inverse of the elasticity of supply;
iii) the elasticity of supply in the static model isomorphic to the dynamic model of the
Canadian property tax system is and
iv) an output tax rate of in the static model maps into a Canadian property tax
rate of
36  V  . =0
Unfortunately, the pre-development land tax rate enters the developer s pro t function,
(A2.3), in a way that does not correspond to the way in which linear input, output or
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With an Eﬃcient Diﬀerentiated Property Tax System, when
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Substituting in (A3.2) gives
(A3.5)
so that
Thus starting at (with ), increasing from a level in
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